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Abstract: This thesis analyses the economic policies of three Islamist parties that have come to 
power in the aftermath of what has come to be known as the Arab Spring. Campaigning on a 
platform emphasizing social justice and wealth redistribution, these parties have likewise embraced 
neoliberal economic policies. This thesis investigates how the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party, 
the Tunisian Ennahda party and the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development have justified 
these two apparent contradictions and whether these parties perceive the latter as being antithetical to 
the former. On the basis of a wide range of primary and secondary sources, I conclude that the main 
channels through which these parties believe social justice and wealth redistribution are to be 
achieved in a neoliberal economy is through ‘trickle-down economics’ and wealth redistribution 
through zakat and other forms of individual charity. Evaluating the respective parties’ periods in 
power, one would have to conclude that as far as securing social justice is concerned, the reality is 
quite different from the campaign rhetoric. This has to some large extent been caused by demands 
raised by international financial institutions in exchange for loans to these countries, but likewise 
occurred prior to engaging in negotiations and eventually signing agreements with these institutions. 
Especially in the realm of labor laws, minimum wage laws, stimulating small and medium size 
enterprises and reducing subsidies on much needed consumer goods, the parties have not lived up to 
their earlier promises.  
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Introduction  
Six years after the Arab Uprisings one can hardly say that the Middle East and North Africa region 
(MENA) has made any significant progress in terms of its political or economic situation. In fact, 
one may even argue that it has worsened, with political repression and economic deprivation at 
unprecedented levels. In this thesis I will analyze the economic policies that have been implemented 
by the parties that came to power in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco in the aftermath of these uprisings.  
Following the overthrow of the long term presidents of Tunisia and Egypt, two Islamist parties were 
given a mandate to govern and manage the affairs of the people residing in those countries. 
Moreover, they emphasized the need for social reform and promised to radically improve the 
economic situation of the two countries and the region alike. As will be argued in this thesis, the 
brief Islamist experiments in both countries have, at least as far as the realm of economics are 
concerned, been disappointing.  
The slogan “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice” captured the very essence of the demonstrators’ 
frustrations and their wishes for the period to come.
1
 The first and third demand, bread and social 
justice, are inherently connected as social justice means bread–or basic foodstuffs in general for that 
matter–for everyone and when everyone has enough ‘bread’ this means that at least the basic tenet 
of social justice is met. The second demand, freedom, is rather meaningless without the other two. 
After all, one cannot enjoy freedom when one’s stomach is empty. It is therefore fundamental to 
investigate the (socio)economic aspects of the uprisings and more importantly the economic course 
of events in the years that followed.  
                                                 
1
 One of the most detailed accounts of the uprisings in Egypt is called “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice” in reference to 
the importance of this slogan for the demands raised during the Arab Uprisings of 2011. Likewise, Roel Meijer states 
that “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice” was “the slogan of the uprisings”. Roel Meijer, “The Workers’ Movement and the 
Arab Uprisings,” International Review of Social History 61 (2016): 488. Gilbert Achcar in turn named his book “The 
People Want…” in reference to another popular chant, but he and others have expressed their agreement on the 
consensus that “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice” was the chant that symbolizes the protestor’s demands. Gilbert Achcar, 
The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising, translated by G.M. Goshgarian (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2013).  
 6 
The protestors in both Tunisia and Egypt were not affiliated with any political party or ideological 
current and were overwhelmingly secular in their demands. As the demonstrations gained 
momentum and the vulnerability of the regimes became increasingly apparent, the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) and Tunisia’s Ennahda party seized the opportunity and in a sense ‘hijacked’ the 
revolution, much to the dismay of many of those involved. Following the ousting of both countries’ 
presidents, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali, parliamentary elections 
were held in October 2011 in Tunisia and December-January 2011-2012 in Egypt and both parties 
were given an ostensible mandate to form a coalition government. Shortly thereafter, in June 2012, 
the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammad Morsi, was elected president of Egypt.
2
  
In addition to Tunisia and Egypt, Morocco also saw an Islamist party come to power. After having 
successfully participated in earlier parliamentary elections–in 1997, 2002 and 2007–the Party for 
Justice and Development (PJD) finally became part of a coalition government following the 2011 
parliamentary elections with its leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, becoming prime minister. There were 
significant protests in Morocco as well during the so-called ‘Spring of 2011’, led by the 20 
February Movement and partly as a result of these demonstrations–but certainly also as a result of 
the ascent of Islamism in the region in general–the country saw an Islamist party come to power for 
the first time in the country’s history. Moreover, during its campaign, the PJD emphasized its desire 
to focus on economic issues and bring more prosperity to average Moroccans by luring investors to 
the country and by forming economic partnerships with other countries in an effort to realize 
economic development.
3
 Given that Morocco’s Islamist experiment occurred at the same time as 
the ones in Tunisia and Egypt, and given that the PJD espoused similar economic rhetoric as these 
                                                 
2
 The Brotherhood ended up nominating a candidate for the presidency after having explicitly stated that it would not 
do so. Daniela Pioppi, “Playing With Fire: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Leviathan,” The International 
Spectator 48 (2013): 57.  
3
 It is important to realize that the notion of economic development and the term ‘development’ in particular was only 
given prominence from World War II onwards, coincidentally with the establishment of the Breton-Woods institutions 
such as the WB and IMF, to divide the world into ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ countries. See H.W. Arndt, 
Economic Development: The History of An Idea (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 49-87; Gustavo 
Esteva, “Development," in Wolfgang Sachs, ed., The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power 
(London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 2009), 6-8.  
 7 
two parties during its electoral campaign, it would be highly informative to compare the historical 
trajectories of the Islamist experiences of the three countries during the past 6 years.   
Prior to the uprisings as well as during the subsequent electoral campaigns, the three parties 
vehemently argued for a radically different economic model, namely one based on equity, social 
justice and more prosperity for all people in society, irrespective of social class. It is therefore of the 
utmost importance to determine to what extent these promises were kept, especially when we 
consider that the underlying state structures and the international political economic reality of the 
countries, and the many constraints this brought with it, have remained unchanged. In other words, 
one may argue that the neoliberal political and economic structures and the rise of “crony 
capitalism” may in fact have been at the root of much of the inequality, corruption and dismay of 
the protestors. If this is the case, how can someone bring about any meaningful change when failing 
to address and even encourage the perpetuation of these state structures? The research question that 
will be investigated in this thesis is therefore how Islamist parties in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco 
have justified their unbridled support for and their active continuation of neoliberal economic 
policies while claiming to champion the rights of the underprivileged and marginalized in society 
and emphasizing social justice? 
The outline of this thesis will be as follows. In the first chapter an overview of the economic 
situation in the region––with a particular emphasis on Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco––prior to the 
uprisings will be provided, as well as a summary theoretical overview of the principles and 
mechanisms of neoliberal economics. The second chapter will discuss the emergence of Islamism 
as an alternative ideology for the masses, following the demise of socialism and to a lesser extent 
nationalism at the end of the 20
th
 century. This chapter will then go on to explain the emergence of 
Islamic economics as an economic philosophy as well as its origins and objectives and some of the 
criticism it has received. Chapter three goes on to briefly describe the history of the respective 
Islamist parties––the Muslim Brotherhood in the case of Egypt, Tunisia’s Ennahda and the Party for 
Justice and Development in Morocco––their views on matters related to the economic predicaments 
 8 
facing the region and several solutions they professed before rising to power. Chapter four will be 
the core chapter of this thesis and in it I will discuss the period the Islamists were in power. In doing 
so, I will critically analyze the economic measures taken by the respective parties and in particular 
engage with the constraints faced by the parties when confronted with realpolitik and how this has 
affected the promises made during the electoral campaigns. This will be done by referring to a rich 
variety of primary and secondary source material from local newspapers and online magazines as 
well as on the basis of information posted to the websites of the respective parties themselves. In 
the final section of the chapter I will discuss my findings and answer the research question. 
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     CHAPTER ONE 
From state led growth to neoliberalism 
Independence 
During the colonial period, Europeans owned and controlled all facets of the colonial economy 
except the actual land on which production took place.
4
 As the colonies were gradually incorporated 
into the world economy, they were assigned the subservient position of providing raw materials and 
proletarian labor from what became economic ‘peripheries’ to the manufacturing ‘centers’ in 
Western Europe.  
Following independence in the case of Morocco and Tunisia––in 1956––and following the 
overthrow of the monarchy in Egypt––in 1952––these states were left without an industrial base, 
growing mainly cash crops and exporting them to industrial centers and were lacking modern 
institutions.
5
 Moreover, the post-colonial states often had to repair the damage done by colonial 
policies either during wars of independence or due to economic underdevelopment. The main 
priority, therefore, was to develop the countries and to overcome the economic backwardness the 
imperial powers had left the region in.
6
 Given the association of poverty with the colonial system of 
exploitation, equity was a primary virtue in independent states after World War II.
7
  
The Egyptian model under Nasser, and Pan-Arabism in general, adopted a socialist approach, 
mobilizing all resources under state control with emphasis being on the creation of jobs and the 
provision of goods of primary importance both in terms of private consumption as well as of 
military or strategic requirement. Under Arab Socialism, land reforms, price and rent controls, food 
                                                 
4
 Charles Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982), 9.  
5
 Umar Chapra, Islam and Economic Development (Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993), 26.  
6
 Melani Cammett, Ishac Diwan, Alan Richards & John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2015), 234.  
7
 Ibid., 235. 
 10 
subsidies and taxation policies were introduced to address the inadequate distribution of wealth.
8
 
Egypt would follow this path of development from 1957 until 1974, with the Socialist Decrees of 
1961 reinforcing the state’s socialist aims when the entire banking, insurance and foreign trade 
sectors were put under state control. At first, this strategy showed promising growth rates, 
averaging 6 per cent per annum, and provided 1 million new jobs under the First Five-Year Plan 
(1960-1965). In 1965, however, it ended in crisis.
9
  
In the end, few state-owned enterprises were profitable and although they provided many with 
secure jobs they pressed heavily on the government budget. Moreover, as everything was sold 
domestically or exchanged with the Communist Block, no foreign reserves were generated. This 
was all the more problematic because many raw materials and capital investments needed to sustain 
these enterprises had to be imported. Following the Six Day War and the severe economic recession 
that followed, Nasser’s death in 1970, the Yom Kippur war in 1973 and the subsequent oil price 
hikes, the Egyptian government, now headed by Anwar Sadat, decided to move away from the 
“socialist transformation” and pursue a more hybrid model of development.10  
Countries like Morocco and Tunisia had followed a different model, namely one in which the state 
facilitated the transformation of the economy by providing (rail)roads, ports and electrical power as 
well as raw and semi-manufactured products, cheap credit, and protective legislation to stimulate 
domestic production and the emergence of an internal private sector.
11
 This model was embraced by 
                                                 
8
 Vincent Durac & Francesco Cavatorta, Politics and Governance in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015), 60-61. 
9
 Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, 240-242; Cavatorta & Merone, Politics and Governance in 
the Middle East, 92-93. 
10
 Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, 241-242. The ‘hybrid model of development’ refers to 
Sadat’s decision to pursue a policy of economic liberalization, aimed at reforming the public sector and stimulating the 
private sector, attracting foreign investments and promoting exports, while the state was still in charge of much of the 
economy and continued to execute a planning economy. 
11
 Ibid., 235. 
 11 
Morocco following independence and by Tunisia from 1969 onwards, after having briefly embraced 
the socialist model from 1964-1969, as well as Egypt following the crisis of 1973-1974.
12
  
Although Morocco never flirted with socialism, the state did play a significant role in the economy 
and especially King Hassan II had a major personal stake in many of the country’s core 
businesses.
13
 He was the majority shareholder in the Omnium Nord Africain company, which 
owned shares in fifty of Morocco’s most notable private businesses.14 As far as this dominant role 
of the monarchy in the economy is concerned, the rule of Mohammed VI, the country’s king since 
1999, has proven no different.
15
  
Morocco has always been an economically liberal and pro-private sector country. The state took 
control of assets such as mines, railroads, dams, sugar refineries, and used the proceeds of these 
assets, as well as its considerable phosphate revenues–Morocco is the world’s largest exporter of 
phosphates–to expand (its grip on) the public sector and ended up employing well over half a 
million people, amounting to at least one-quarter of the non-agricultural workforce in the country. 
However, from the late 1970s onwards, phosphate prices fell and Morocco’s costly war in Western 
Sahara began to press heavily on the government budget, pushing it to large deficits and a soaring 
external debt of $10 billion. The state had no choice but to curb public expenditures and stimulate 
the private sector as well as attract foreign investment.
16
    
Immediately after independence in 1956, president Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia sought to maintain 
the liberal economy of the French Protectorate era, but complement it with a redistribution of 
wealth. Instead of expropriating European possessions, the state distributed land vacated by 
                                                 
12
 This occurred in the case of the latter two due to the perceived failure of Arab Socialism following the 1967 and 
1973 wars with Israel, the end of the Bretton-Woods era of fixed exchange rates and the oil price hikes of the mid-
1970s as a result of which countries were required to obtain foreign reserves–predominantly US dollars, the only 
currency with which one can purchase oil in international oil markets–to pay for their oil imports. The massive increase 
in these countries’ indebtedness over the course of the 1970s is a direct result of their inability to do so, after which they 
were forced to turn to international financial institutions for loans.  
13
 James Sater, Morocco: Challenges To Tradition and Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2010), 9-10.  
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, 252-255. 
 12 
Europeans who left the country after independence.
17
 As the needs of the population became 
increasingly more pressing, Bourguiba decided that the state should take a more active role and 
began the development of ‘Neo-Destour Socialism’, under which the public, private and cooperate 
sectors were to “coexist”. Following the decision to forsake the socialist model in 1969, the 
Tunisian government sought to firmly support the private sector, adopting a strategy of export 
promotion to the neighboring European Economic Community. Nevertheless, the state would 
maintain a dominant role in the economy until Ben Ali took over from Bourguiba in 1987.
18
  
The period of state-led growth has led to significant growth rates, and has provided relatively well 
paid jobs with generous social benefits for workers. Moreover, the emphasis on education, equity, 
and the general well-being of the population has led to a relatively well-educated population, a 
health sector that was much better than before independence, and the provision of many basic goods 
and foodstuffs at subsidized prices. However, the overall effect of state-led activities was negative. 
Many of the public enterprises established did not generate profits and demanded valuable 
resources, many of which were lacking and had to be imported. Moreover, the dominant role of the 
state in fostering development, mostly in Egypt, but also to a large extent in Tunisia and Morocco, 
prevented strong private sectors from emerging. From the late 1970s onwards, when economic 
liberalization occurred under the guise of international financial institutions (IFIs), many of the 
prerequisites for economic liberalization were lacking and the void left by the state was not filled by 
the middle class, as ought to have been, but by cronies of the regimes in place.
19
 
When the regimes in the three countries realized that they needed to find a way to revive the 
economic growth process while at the same time maintaining their grip on society, they turned to 
the upper echelons of the security services and the army as well as certain people close to the ruling 
                                                 
17
 Kenneth Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 145-147. 
18
 Cammett et al. A Political Economy of the Middle East, 248-249. 
19
 Ibid., 258; Achcar, The People Want, 63. 
 13 
families.
20
 In the transition to economic liberalization and privatization, vast assets were transferred 
from the state to newly established business elites at artificially low prices.
21
 This ‘liberalization’ 
further eroded the legitimacy of these regimes, which until then had at least subsidized basic 
foodstuffs and other basic necessities and had provided many with secure jobs.  
Collapse 
The 1970s also saw the accumulation of vast national debts in the three countries as a result of a 
series of economic setbacks (crises of 1967 and 1973, disappointing performance by state-owned 
enterprises, high defense expenditures), but was mostly due to the sudden increase in oil prices in 
1973-1974.
22
 The increase in the price of this vital commodity meant that many developing 
countries suddenly saw their import bills increase and found themselves in acute liquidity problems. 
Liquidity was supplied primarily through loans by oil exporting countries to oil-starved countries, a 
phenomenon known as petrodollar recycling.
23
 However, this meant that the net amount of 
borrowing for countries like Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt rose from close to zero during the 1960s 
to around 7 per cent of GDP per year during the 1970s.
24
 It did not last long before countries 
experienced debt repayment problems and had to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
emergency loans. Egypt received its first IMF loan in 1976, Morocco in 1983, followed by Tunisia 
in 1986.
25
    
The IMF demanded that the countries drastically liberalize their economies. This included cutting 
subsidies on basic foodstuffs and other heavily subsidized products, cutting public sector 
                                                 
20
 Durac & Cavatorta, Politics and Governance in the Middle East, 91. 
21
 Achcar, The People Want, 63. 
22
 Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, 258-264. 
23
 Ibid., Abdallah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba and its Contemporary 
Interpretation (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 11. 
24
 Cammett et al. A Political Economy of the Middle East, 264. 
25
 Durac & Cavatorta, Politics and Governance in the Middle East, 62-93; Jane Harrigan, Chengang Wang & Hamed 
el-Said, “The Economic and Political Determinants of IMF and World Bank Lending in the Middle East and North 
Africa,” World Development 34 (2006): 255.  
 14 
expenditures, privatizing public enterprises, devaluing the currency and reducing tariffs.
26
 These 
policies were implemented to varying degrees; the rise of crony capitalism meant that powerful 
interests were preventing the regimes from implementing reforms too drastically. In Egypt, Sadat 
and his successor Mubarak were well aware of the repercussions price increases and massive 
layoffs of public sector employees would have for the survival of the unpopular regime. Rather than 
implementing structural adjustments completely, Mubarak therefore struck a delicate balance 
between sufficiently adjusting in line with IMF demands, but not enough to further alienate the 
people.
27
 The Tunisian government under the control of Ben Ali chose to implement reforms step 
by step instead of all at once, but ended up closely cooperating with the IMF and lived up to its 
commitments.
28
 Although hampered by the personal stake of the king and prominent members of 
the makhzen (the Moroccan state elite), Morocco systematically implemented a wide range of 
economic reforms. The country’s regime had been tested in 1965 and in 1982, when food price rises 
had provoked violent protests and strikes in many urban areas. This happened again after securing a 
new IMF loan, but rigorous implementation of the reforms resulted in the country being heralded as 
a textbook case of successful economic reform.
29
   
Neoliberalism 
The 1990s marked a further consolidation of the neoliberal model after the fall of communism had 
become a fact and saw the emergence of the ‘Washington Consensus’, a term coined by economist 
John Williamson, as the basis for future development assistance. Apart from stringent additional 
demands on the part of the IFIs, the latter increasingly saw to it that the reforms were in fact 
implemented and that the ‘mistakes’ of the previous two decades were not repeated. To secure this, 
the IMF would provide funds in “slices”, each being provided after a number of steps in the right 
                                                 
26
 Bradford Dillman, “International markets and partial economic reforms in North Africa: what happened to 
democratization,” Democratization 9 (2002): 69-71. 
27
 Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, 267-269. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., 302. 
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direction had been demonstrably taken.
30
 On the eve of the Arab uprisings, therefore, the regimes of 
all three countries had adopted an economic system in which most production takes place in the 
private sector and had implemented all-encompassing neoliberal policies in line with the 
‘Washington Consensus’.31  
Neoliberal economics was developed at the University of Chicago from the 1950s through 1970s.
32
 
As the shortcomings of Keynesian economics became increasingly apparent during the 1970s–
resulting in soaring inflation rates, high unemployment levels and falling growth rates–some 
economists argued that this was due to continuous government intervention and that it was 
imperative for the latter to stop. Although the post-war period (1945-1970) saw very high rates of 
growth, the stagnation of the mid-1970s–which to a large extent was the result of the peculiar 
situation caused by the oil crisis of 1973-1974 and the ensuing inflation and economic crisis that 
erupted as a result–provided the rationale for the liberalization of markets and a retreat of the state 
in matters of economics. With the rise of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan on the political 
scene, the stage was set for extensive deregulation and privatization.
33
   
Neoliberal economic theory places total and complete confidence in the efficiency of markets in 
optimally allocating factors of production on the basis of their respective supply and demand in an 
economy.
34
 Markets are inherently optimizing in this regard and all government intervention will 
therefore work against the interests of society.
35
 Each ‘rational’ individual consumer consumes on 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., 273-275. 
31
 Ibid. See John Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, DC: Institute 
for International Economics, 1990); John Williamson, “Democracy and the ‘Washington Consensus’,” World 
Development 21 (1993) for an overview of what comprised the Washington Consensus.   
32
 Key figures in the ‘Chicago School’ include Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Ronald Coase, and Gary Becker, all of 
whom have been awarded the Nobel Prize in economics at some point during their careers. Thomas Palley, “From 
Keynesianism to Neoliberalism: Shifting paradigms in Economics,” in Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnston, eds., 
Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 29.  
33
 Palley, “From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism,” 20-29.  
34
 Shampa Roy-Mukherjee, “Connecting the Dots: The Washington Consensus and the ‘Arab Spring’,” Journal of 
Balkan and Near East Studies 17 (2015): 144.  
35
 Palley, “From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism,” 27. In practice, however, the state is actually quite involved in 
economic affairs raised under the banner of neoliberalism. For instance, the market conditions that the World Trade 
Organization–the international trade regime–wishes to enforce have been negotiated by the powerful states of the world 
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the basis of his or her individual preferences,
36
 which means that producers will supply that which 
is demanded. Given that society consists of the aggregate of these individual consumers and 
producers, an economic system solely based on supply and demand therefore automatically secures 
the most efficient allocation of capital and labor.  
Factors of production––capital and labor––are paid according to what they are worth, meaning 
according to their relative supply and demand. When capital is relatively scarce, but demand is 
high, the ‘price’ paid for capital, the interest rate, will be high and vice versa. There is therefore no 
need for government policies targeting the interest rate, because this will automatically be 
accomplished through the supply and demand mechanism. The same is true for labor. The relative 
abundance of and demand for labor as well as its productivity will determine its price, employees’ 
wages, and there is no need for minimum or maximum wages set by the government. When labor 
demand is high, wages will automatically rise, as will be the case when workers’ productivity 
increases (usually by technological innovation or through education/experience). Given the 
emphasis of Keynesian economics on fighting unemployment, neoliberal theory suggests that 
although free markets will not let valuable factors of production be unused, unemployment is only a 
‘natural’ consequence of the state of the market (in times of recession unemployment is the 
optimum reaction to the state of the economy and as such good) and should not be interfered with.
37
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
and hence required state interference. Likewise, the European Union and United States have adopted many protectionist 
policies to protect domestic markets against foreign products, while at the same time providing billions in taxpayer 
money to private businesses in export subsidies. See the following chapters in Saad-Filho & Johnston’s Neoliberalism; 
Ronaldo Munck, “Neoliberalism and Politics, and the Politics of Neoliberalism,” 62 and Henry Veltmeyer & James 
Petras, “Foreign Aid, Neoliberalism and US Imperialism,” 132.  
36
 Such a consumer goes by the name ‘homo economicus’. 
37
 For an overview of how neoliberalism would work in theory see Saad-Filho & Johnston, Neoliberalism, 9-79 and 
185-258; José Antonio Ocampo & Joseph Stiglitz, Capital Market Liberalization and Development (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). See Ray Bush, Poverty and Neoliberalism: Persistence and Reproduction in the Global South 
(London: Pluto Press, 2007); Laura Guazzone & Daniella Pioppi, eds., The Arab State and Neo-liberal Globalization: 
The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2009); Adam Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt: 
Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013); Evelyn Huber & Fred Solt, 
“Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism,” Latin American Research Review 39 (2004) for an overview and some 
criticism of how the structural adjustment programs of the Washington Consensus have worked out in practice for some 
developing countries on which they were imposed. 
 17 
In terms of equity or the (re)distribution of income in society, neoliberal theory asserts that wealth 
generated at the top will automatically ‘trickle down’ to those below. This implies that economic 
growth benefits all (though not equally) and that everyone gets his or her share from the prosperity 
gained through economic privatization and liberalization.
38
 It is important to mention that the theory 
assumes an equal playing field for all actors in society; both white and blue collar workers are 
assumed to have equal access to (human) capital, do not suffer from differences in social 
background or class, and do not experience barriers to enter and participate in markets. Evidently, 
this is not the reality of the situation.     
Given that all government intervention will inevitably lead to a sub-optimum in the economy, 
monetary and fiscal policy measures ought to be prevented. Monetary policy, the policy mechanism 
employed by a country’s central bank to reach its objectives–price stability, the setting of interest 
rates, inflation targeting, and economic growth–should be left to the market. The lowering of 
interest rates by the Central Bank will only lead to inflation as it is lower than market forces 
demand and as such increases borrowing and spending for a fixed number of goods which leads to 
inflation. Increasing interest rates means more money will be taken from the economy and stored at 
bank accounts, reducing demand and increasing the costs of investment, which causes the economy 
to contract. Fiscal policy will have a similar effect.
39
  
Then there is neoliberalism’s desire to deregulate, meaning less government regulation in matters 
related to the economy. The idea is that the less bureaucracy and ‘red tape’ there is in a country the 
smoother the economic process can occur, the more growth will take place and the more society as 
a whole (usually measured in Gross Domestic Product per capita) will benefit. Economic efficiency, 
                                                 
38
 See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, “A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development,” The Review of 
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another sacred cow of neoliberal philosophy, will only really be achieved when the government 
deregulates and privatizes all assets in an economy and supply and demand for goods and services 
can reach its full potential.
40
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CHAPTER TWO 
The emergence of Islamism and Islamic Economic Thought   
The previous chapter describes the experiences of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia with different 
models of economic development and the limited successes they have yielded. As these 
experiments proceeded and as dissatisfaction with the political status quo increased, a new 
‘solution’ was presented for the problems–all problems–the region found itself in. Islamism was 
hailed as a solution and on the eve of the Arab Uprisings had a significant following among many 
in the Arab World. In this chapter, I will analyze the history of Islamism and investigate the 
theoretical solutions it offers to the predicaments experienced by the Muslim World, especially as 
far as the realm of economics is concerned.  
Islamic Movements  
As imperialism turned into occupation and colonial rule at the end of the nineteenth century, the call 
for a–sometimes violent–rejection of European domination began to gain voice. In Egypt, people 
like Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and his disciple Rashid Rida (1865-1935), called for a return 
to the period of the earliest generations of Muslims when people were most pious and when the 
Muslim world was thriving and was moreover the center of science and innovation in the world.
41
 A 
current known as ‘Salafism’ emerged and as the early twentieth century progressed, with notable 
events such as the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 and the consolidation of the al Sa‘ud 
family in what would become Saudi Arabia, Salafism gained in prominence in the region.
42
  
In the decades that followed, Salafism began to take root in the madrasas (religious educational 
centers) at Qarawiyyin and Zaytuna–Morocco and Tunisia’s most prestigious and influential centers 
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of Islamic studies–but also in modern schools set up by the French Protectorate and Egyptian 
journals, most notably the writings of Abduh and Rida, were disseminated among students.
43
 In 
North Africa, as in other areas under colonial rule, the ideas of Salafism were intimately connected 
to the quest for national liberation and were a reaction to colonial, cultural, social and political 
influences from abroad.
44
  
In Egypt, Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) founded the Society of the Muslim Brothers in 1928. 
According to al-Banna, who was heavily influenced by Rashid Rida’s periodical al-Manar, the 
problems of foreign economic, political and military domination were the result of Western secular 
values and practices. The solution to the problems facing the country was to set itself free from 
foreign control, which would only be possible by a return to Islam, through a system that he 
referred to as din wa dawla (religion and state). Secularism was to be rejected and Islam would 
guide people’s everyday life, as well as constitute a political system that would govern on the basis 
of principles inherently opposed to those of the secular West.
45
  
After World War II, however, Egypt and many other Arab states would turn to Arab nationalism 
under the leadership of Gamal Abd al-Nasser, under whose rule Islamist currents such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood were brutally repressed, with many of its members being imprisoned, tortured, 
or even executed. Arab nationalism thrived under Nasser, not in the least due to its resistance to 
Western powers and its stance against Israel. After the crushing defeat of the Arab armies during 
the Six Day War in 1967, Arab nationalism lost its appeal as a source of pride for traditional 
Muslims and secular Arabs alike and especially the former began to look for other ideologies that 
related to their sense of demise and marginalization. During the reign of Anwar Sadat, Islamist 
student associations began to distribute inexpensive booklets and pamphlets containing the ideas of 
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prominent Islamists among university campuses and Islamic book fairs. As the popularity of leftist 
student groups and Arab nationalism in general declined after the 1967 and 1973 wars, the Islamists 
gained the support of economically marginalized and socially conservative students by addressing 
their real life needs and providing an alternative solution.
46
  
Moreover, as the region’s shift to economic liberalization and far-reaching neoliberal reforms began 
to be felt in society an increasing number of people suffered economic deprivation and 
marginalization.
47
 Islamist groups had always been very active in the provision of social services to 
the needy and poor and with the ever decreasing subsidies for primary needs and less public funds 
for employment in the public sector, increasingly many people were becoming dependent on 
Islamist groups for their basic needs.
48
 An underground network of service provision began to 
develop, headed by organizations such as the MB, which resulted in growing support for such 
organizations and their ideology. The Brotherhood has always seen itself primarily as a society of 
preachers spreading a message of Islam and Islamization (da‘wa). It was therefore only natural that 
large segments of the population–initially predominantly the middle classes, but later also the 
working classes–became influenced by their teachings.49   
Another major event that likewise occurred directly after the Yom Kippur war of 1973 was a 
dramatic increase of crude oil prices. As oil revenues skyrocketed, countries like Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait began to export their fundamentalist interpretation of Islam throughout the Muslim world.
50
 
Grants were given to students wishing to study in the Gulf, who after having been exposed to 
Wahabbism would return to their countries of origin where they would often find employment as 
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clerics. At the same time, a growing corpus of Neo-Salafist literature was being produced and 
distributed to all corners of the globe. In recent years, with the technological progress of the last two 
decades, this message has been distributed to an even broader audience through satellite television 
channels and via the internet.
51
  
The overall effect of this development has been increased exposure by laymen in the Muslim world 
to ideas that are Islamist in nature and which have resonated with many men, women and children 
in the region. These people, often extremely disappointed with the political system in their 
countries, were convinced that the only feasible solution to the malaise the Muslims find themselves 
in is to return to–a rather strict interpretation of–Islam.52  
Islamic economics 
These developments have had an influence on the way the phenomenon of the economy was 
perceived. After all, when one contends that Islam is a “comprehensive system”53 governing all 
aspects of society, it also covers the realm of economics. From the 1970s onwards, the idea of 
Islamic economics has been given prominence in Islamist doctrine. With the ascent of Islamist 
thought as a reaction to (economic) imperialism, an economic system in line with the perceived 
teachings of Islam on this topic was developed which would provide a solid formula for economic 
development and poverty alleviation.    
Abul A‘la Maudoodi (1903-1979), the famous Indo-Pakistani Islamist, discussed the concept of 
Islamic economics as being a system in which a balance would be struck between the harshness of 
capitalism and the distributive justice of socialism.
54
 The current secular economic system of the 
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West was ‘Satanic’55 and communism was only marginally less so.56  The Islamic solution, he 
argued, perceives the economic problem of man in simple terms: how should economic distribution 
be arranged so that everyone has access to the basic necessities of life?
57
 God’s earth is rich and can 
provide for everyone, but some men have usurped the wealth of the earth and as they consolidated 
their power have turned to conspicuous consumption, which benefit only a few, but in the process 
squander a good deal of raw material and human labor at the expense of the majority of the 
population.
58
 The real problem of the current economic system occurs when man demands more 
than he needs and starts to live beyond the limits of moderation set to him by God.
59
 The economic 
system Maudoodi envisaged, therefore, saw to it that man’s real needs and requirements are met 
and that conspicuous consumption and moral degradation (which is the cause of the former) are 
removed from the hearts of men.
60
 Without these evils, and with the “Islamic laws of trade and 
industry” in their place, it becomes virtually impossible for someone to obtain vast sums of 
wealth.
61
 These laws would ensure that all things haram or unlawful were outlawed, which would 
result in an economy where gambling, speculation, business based on fraud and deceit, holding 
back the necessities of life with the object of raising prices (hoarding), and monopolies on the 
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means of production by a select group of people, would not be present.
62
 Likewise, and quite 
fundamental in the Islamic economic philosophy, it would ban interest.
63
 The Islamic system would 
naturally manifest itself as the most useful, correct, and rational method for the welfare of 
humanity, by banning these evils and by redirecting resources otherwise used for conspicuous 
consumption to productive use for the benefit of everyone.
64
 
A second Islamist thinker engaging with the topic of social justice in Islam was the Egyptian Sayyid 
Qutb (1906-1966). Like Maudoodi, he emphasized that Islam forbids “unbridled luxury in 
possessions and desires, which produces social division and classes”65, which in turn can only be 
overcome by focusing on Islam’s “supreme human aim,”66 namely ensuring social justice, which 
brings absolute spiritual and economic freedom for all Muslims.
67
 Full spiritual exaltation cannot be 
achieved when people have to beg for their most basic necessities and Islam’s religious law 
therefore aims to tackle the causes of such a state of being by ensuring that man has abundant 
access to his basic necessities. Private property is a good thing, but it must be redistributed among 
the people and not used as a means to plunder the people.
68
 Likewise, its returns must be used to 
help those in need, which is why God instituted the giving of zakat. This form of almsgiving 
purifies the individual by washing away one’s sins, but also purifies capital; capital/property over 
which zakat has been paid is blessed by God and benefits the poor in a community, which is why 
Qutb labels it “the most essential part of economic theory in Islam”.69 The exact opposite of zakat is 
riba or interest; it does not multiply with God and only harms the individual engaged in it, while at 
the same time seriously harming the community.  
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However, complete social justice will not be achieved unless it arises from an inner conviction that 
by acting in accordance with the needs of society the individual is serving God and acting in 
accordance with God’s commands and is moreover contributing to the elevation of society.70 Only 
when society, being the aggregate of all individuals, thinks and behaves in accordance with this 
principle will absolute social justice be achieved and will no man suffer from any neglect.
71
 In 
reality, Qutb argued, society is diverging ever further from this ideal due to the ascent of secular 
virtues and values.  
In this respect, there is one last prolific writer who deserves to be mentioned in this discussion on 
the topic of Islamic economics, namely the Iraqi ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935-1980). 
In his voluminous work Iqtisadunā (Our Economics), written in 1961, al-Sadr juxtaposes capitalism 
and socialism in order to arrive at a synthesis that is Islamic economics. Although less dismissive 
towards socialism than Maudoodi, he attempts to show that the Islamic economic view is the 
synthesis to the excesses of capitalism in its modern form and the completely state run socialist 
model, which he rejects for its complete lack of private property.
72
  
In accordance with Baqir al-Sadr, Qutb and Maudoodi unanimously agree that the right to private 
property is firmly established in Islam and trade between people is encouraged.
73
 After all, 
Muhammad himself had been a merchant prior to his Prophethood. In fact, Islam attaches so much 
value to ‘free markets’ and no government intervention that no artificial pricing is allowed (no price 
ceilings or minimum wages) as this will only harm society.
74
 However, the objective and mindset 
involved in free markets and the allocation of factors of production is perceived differently. Instead 
of placing monetary profits and efficiency as drivers of the economy, theorists of Islamic economics 
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argue that “need fulfilment” should be the top priority. Moreover, Siddiqi argues that this objective 
should not be sacrificed for any other objective such as growth, which is the holy grail of secular 
economics to the extent that a gain in equity and justice is even worth some loss in efficiency.
75
  
The constitution of an Islamic state must contain a clause incorporating the principle of need 
fulfilment for every individual living within its territorial jurisdiction to make sure the government 
sees to it that the primary needs of all citizens are met and can be held responsible if it fails to 
deliver on this.
76
 
Apart from the strictly economic aspects of an Islamic economy, efforts were made to establish a 
financial system that would operate without having to resort to ribā (usually translated as interest), 
which is explicitly forbidden in the Quran and by the mid-1980s a “mature and comprehensive 
model of interest free banking” existed.77 Islamic economic theorists envisaged that ‘Profit and 
Loss Sharing’ (PLS) was to be the core principle of Islamic banking.78 In other words, both the 
client and the bank have to be exposed to the risk of the project failing. On this basis, two forms of 
halal  financing were developed that would allow a borrower to obtain a loan in line with Islamic 
principles. 
Specific forms of risk sharing 
The first such contract, called mudaraba, is a contract between two parties where one party, the 
investor, provides money to a second party, the mudarib for the purpose of conducting trade. The 
mudarib provides his time and labor and manages the project according to the terms set out in the 
contract. The profit, if any, will be shared between the investor and the mudarib on a proportional 
basis agreed upon before signing the contract. If a loss were to occur, this should be borne by the 
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investor alone.
79
 The contract specifies all the details of the project and the sole role of the mudarib 
is therefore to uphold the terms provided in the contract.
80
 The risk that both parties are exposed to 
justifies the profit-sharing. The investor risks losing a part or all of the capital invested while the 
mudarib risks spending his time and energy without receiving any compensation.
81
 Mudaraba 
constructions predominantly occur for the short term buying and selling of products for which the 
outcome is almost certain. The investor precisely determines how the borrower should sell the 
goods. This means that losses hardly ever occur.
82
 
In the second type PLS financing, called musharaka, both parties invest financially. The ratio does 
not have to be 50-50, but both the investor and the borrower must have a financial stake in the 
project. Just as in a mudaraba, profits are shared according to a predetermined ratio which does not 
have to correspond to the financial input of both sides. Losses, however, ought to be borne on the 
basis of capital input. In most instances, the bank would provide (most of) the money and the 
partner, apart from providing the remaining sum, would carry out the projects and offer his labor 
and skill. The musharaka is therefore an excellent way to bring together labor and capital for the 
production of socially beneficial goods and services and can be used for all projects with a profit 
seeking motive.
83
 The details of the project are determined beforehand and are clearly specified in 
the contract.  
In practice, however, Islamic banks have found that PLS is hampered by moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems and as such its usage is not as widespread as one may have hoped. This has led 
Islamic banks to work around strict PLS operations meaning that the way they finance products 
amounts to nothing less than risk-free or fixed income financing. Furthermore, although PLS 
financing may provide a solution to problems encountered by traders and entrepreneurs, this often 
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becomes more difficult when government loans to finance budget deficits or consumer loans are 
concerned.
84
 
This has given rise to the most widespread form of ‘Islamic’ finance, namely the murabaha 
contract, in which one party approaches a bank for a loan to purchase goods from a third party and 
agrees to repay the principle sum plus a markup, agreed upon before the sale is completed.
85
 In 
other words, the bank knows what its profit is going to be beforehand and moreover it knows that 
this profit is a fixed sum of money (and not a ratio), irrespective of the success of the borrower’s 
project. Hence, in a murabaha there is no profit and loss sharing and the bank gets a fixed rate of 
return on its ‘investment’. Returns under such a construction are thus virtually the same as interest 
payments, where the latter is usually understood to be a compensation for the bank’s service and the 
‘costs’ associated with the time the bank does not have the money at its disposal. The question then 
becomes what the principle objection to fixed interest rates is when Islamic jurists, meaning 
contemporary shari‘a scholars, have allowed murabaha as a means of financing.86 
Social Justice 
Islamic economics’ primary concern is to establish social justice and establish a moral economy and 
adherents of Islamic economics have emphasized redistribution in order to assure that the primary 
needs of Muslims are fulfilled. This can be achieved in a number of ways. Zakat, one of the five 
pillars of Islam, mandates that people who can afford to do so must spend a portion of their wealth 
in alms to the poor. The percentages differ depending on the type of wealth (land rent, income from 
labor, profit from trade etc.), but in most cases amounts to 2.5 per cent of one’s wealth. If every 
Muslim would give this modest amount to be circulated among the poor this would drastically 
reduce poverty and would oversee the provision of basic necessities to those who need it.  
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Another channel through which social justice is to be achieved is to make sure that food and other 
necessities are not hoarded by producers or traders for speculative gains. When food is artificially 
made scarce through hoarding (by storing grain in a silo, rather than selling it on the market for 
instance) supply drops, which means that prices rise. Nowadays, in a global market place with 
massive speculation in commodity markets, setting prices artificially in this way can yield immense 
profits. The burden, however, always falls on the poorest who simply cannot afford to feed their 
families when this occurs. As we shall see later, one of the main causes of the uprisings of 2011 was 
an increase in food prices. Islamic economic theory therefore demands that food and other vital 
commodities should be freely available at market prices (i.e. without state intervention). Given that 
all that is on the earth and all that man harvests from the earth is a right bestowed upon man by God 
it should not be withheld from those who need it. The foremost concern of social justice in Islam is 
therefore, as Siddiqi formulates it, to guarantee “a minimum level of living” to every person within 
the territory of an Islamic state and to realize this distribution as well as production should aim to 
supply those goods and services that are the most beneficial to the population.
87
  
All this would result in the realization of the ‘moral economy’, namely a collection of markets 
where riba is prohibited, people behave honestly and honorably out of taqwa–fear of God and 
awareness of His presence–zakat is given to the needy and not financial profit but the general 
interest of all people in society–maslaha–is pursued as instructed by divine decree. The 
fundamental objective of this ‘moral economy’ is to reinsert a strong sense of ethics into economic 
transactions and to ensure that people conduct business in harmony with God’s instructions and to 
the benefit of all in society.
88
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Critique 
Islamic economics has also received a fair amount of criticism, most notably from the Turkish 
American academic Timur Kuran. He has argued that approaching economics and economic 
transactions through an Islamic scope is an anachronistic phenomenon; never in the 1400 years of 
Islam’s existence have Muslim scholars perceived economics as a phenomenon that is to be studied 
primarily in religious terms. Nevertheless, a whole field of study has been devoted to it in an 
attempt to differentiate Islamic economics from mainstream economics. Kuran argues that this 
mindset originates in late-colonial India–the era in which Maudoodi wrote his treatises–and served 
as an instrument of identity creation against colonial rule rather than some sort of Islamic economic 
revivalism.
89
 Kuran has also illustrated that when collected by governments, zakat, where much of 
Islamic economic theory focuses on, rather than serving as a means for the redistribution of wealth, 
often results in the poor becoming poorer–with zakat collectors distributing it among their kin and 
clients.
90
 In a similar vein, Charles Tripp has argued that the notion of social justice is a concept 
that has “little or no precedent in the traditions of Islamic thought” and was in a sense invented by 
the writings of Qutb and Maudoodi.
91
 However, emphasis on the general interest of society 
(maslaha) has indeed been a constant theme throughout Islamic history.
92
  
Olivier Roy argues that the Islamic economy exclusively concerns the banking sector and that it 
seems quite uninterested in developing a genuinely Islamic system of production.
93
 Likewise, he 
argues that it is a system lacking socioeconomic analysis in that it does not bother to identify the 
causes of inflation in the Muslim world, what drives economic agents and other processes that are at 
the basis of modern economic analysis.
94
 Although this has somewhat improved over the past two 
decades, Islamic economic theory stills fails to fully grasp the essence of the dynamics involved in 
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contemporary (international) economics and economic analysis and appears to limit itself to 
pictures and small talk concerning what ought to be, according to the supposed ideal derived from 
the Qurʾān and sunna. However, an analysis of and much less so solutions to the very real economic 
problems facing the Muslim world, and the developing world at large, are not provided.  
Regarding Islamic finance, Khan argues that the vast majority of Islamic financial contracts–over 
90%–are of the non-PLS type and hence do not satisfy the conditions envisaged by Islamic banking 
theorists; it is simply conventional finance disguised in Islamic terminology.
95
  
Finally, and extremely relevant for the following two chapters, as far as the traditional emphasis on 
avoiding conspicuous consumption is concerned, some contemporary Islamic preachers–such as 
Amr Khaled in Egypt–propagate that a type of neoliberal Islam, one in which hard work is 
complemented with charity, is in fact dedication to God and that a consumption driven lifestyle 
does not diminish one’s piety. Rather than act as an alternative to neoliberal development, this 
interpretation of Islam acts as a legitimation of excessive consumption as long as it is sustained by 
Islamic values.
96
 This attitude also resembles the ‘Turkish Model’ developed and implemented by 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey over the course of the past decade and a half.
97
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CHAPTER THREE 
The MB, Ennahda and PJD before coming to power 
The historical trajectory of the parties under study in this thesis has differed significantly. In this 
chapter I will provide a very brief overview of the respective parties, followed by a descriptive 
overview of their economic ideas, primarily on the basis of electoral programs presented before the 
parliamentary elections of 2011-2012.  
Historical trajectory of the parties 
Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by a schoolteacher named Hasan al-Banna. 
Marginalized and brutally repressed for decades, the movement delicately balanced between 
remaining a clandestine organization that was mostly operating under the radar while coming to 
terms with the political game in which democracy and a more moderate attitude towards much of 
what it considered ‘godlessness’ in Egyptian politics seemed inevitable. Although suspicion has 
remained concerning the exact agenda of this perceived moderation, especially regarding its more 
conservative elements who from 2007 onwards took over the Guidance Bureau, the organization’s 
Politburo, the party began to participate in elections–with some success–and openly dismissed the 
desire to turn Egypt into an Islamic state.
98
  
On the eve of the uprisings, the Brotherhood was by far the most well-organized opposition 
movement in Egypt.
99
 It is therefore all the more surprising that when demonstrations broke out on 
January 25, 2011, they were the notable absentees. Youths affiliated with the Brotherhood asked the 
organization’s senior leadership for permission to participate in the protests, but the latter refused to 
do so. It was not until the youths declared that they would participate either way and the scope and 
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apparent success of the protests became obvious that the Brotherhood decided to join on 28 January 
and saved the revolution.
100
  
The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was established in May 2011, meaning that the Brotherhood 
could legally participate in elections as a party, rather than have its candidates run as independents 
as had been the case under Mubarak. However, the party was closely tied to the Brotherhood and 
the latter continued to have a strong influence on its ideological course. This is a remarkable 
difference compared to the PJD and Ennahda, which operated as fully independent parties by the 
time they came to power in 2011. 
Ennahda 
In 1981, the Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique (MTI) was formed and in 1989, after it had 
become Tunisia’s largest Islamist group, changed its name to Ennahda.101 Relentlessly repressed for 
decades, the party came to the fore after the overthrow of president Ben Ali. The movement’s co-
founder and president, Rachid Ghannouchi, had spent much of the latter’s presidency in exile in 
London and had over time moderated his views, especially after the disastrous events that shook 
Algeria during the 1990s. In exile, he had fully embraced democratic values and clearly expressed 
the need for a civil state in Tunisia.
102
 Ennahda can be seen as a typical example of a party that has 
moderated through exclusion; repression of the party and the subsequent exile of its leadership has 
caused the party to moderate its stances on many issues, resulting in Ennahda being seen as the 
most moderate and most pragmatic of the Islamist parties in the region.
103
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Party for Justice and Development 
The Moroccan Party for Justice and Development (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD) 
emerged in 1997 as the political branch of the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR); the former 
would engage in matters of politics whereas the latter would limit itself to religious proselytizing or 
da‘wa.104 The PJD has operated as a legally acknowledged party since 1997 and had participated in 
three elections prior to the ones of 2011.
105
 Since its inception, the party has had considerable 
success, winning 9 out of 325 seats in the 1997 parliamentary elections, 42 in 2002
106
, 46 in 2007 
and 104 in 2011 out of a total of 395.
107
 Its electoral victory in 2011 meant it was the largest party 
in Morocco and according to the new constitution of 2011 would supply the country’s Prime 
Minister.
108
 The MUR was known to be a relatively radical movement and used its influence to 
force the PJD down a more conservative path, certainly in the latter’s early years in politics.109 
However, as the PJD matured politically and as it became increasingly familiar with the ‘regime 
game’, which in the case of Morocco means the extent to which a party is tolerated by the 
monarchy,
110
 certainly before the constitutional reforms of 2011,
111
 the MUR’s influence over the 
                                                 
104
 Ashraf Nabih el-Sherif, “Institutional and Ideological Re-construction of the Justice and Development Party (PJD): 
The Question of Democratic Islamism in Morocco,” The Middle East Journal 66 (2012): 661. 
105
 See Eva Wegner, Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Party of Justice and Development in Morocco 
(New York: Syracruse University Press, 2011) for a detailed overview of the PJD prior to its period in power. 
106
 Leaked information suggests that the PJD had actually won 57 seats but had to settle for 42. This would have meant 
that they were in fact the biggest party and Morocco could theoretically have had an Islamist Prime Minister as early as 
2002. See Zeghal, Islamism in Morocco, 183. 
107
 Bouyahya, Islam-Oriented Parties’ Ideologies, 2. 
108
 Hafez Ghanem. The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Toward Greater Inclusiveness (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2016), 373. 
109
 The PJD had a good chance of being part of the governing coalition after the 2002 elections, but the MUR vetoed 
participation on the basis of among other things the absence of the introduction of interest-free loans and the fact that in 
the eyes of the MUR the government did not sufficiently defend the country’s Islamic identity. Wegner, Islamist 
Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes, 63-64.  
110
 Mohamed Daadaoui. Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining Makhzen Power (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 125. It is also for this reason that other Islamist groups in Morocco, such as Sheikh 
Abdessalam Yassine’s Justice and Benevolence, which criticizes the king’s authority as ‘commander of the faithful’, 
has been marginalized by the authorities (see Zeghal, Islamism in Morocco, 115-190  for an overview of Sheikh 
Yassine’s life and political views). The PJD, however, has continuously expressed its support for the monarchy, also 
after demonstrations erupted in the country led by the 20 February movement as well as when being in government. See 
el-Sherif, “Institutional and Ideological Re-construction of the Justice and Development Party (PJD)” and Daadaoui 
Moroccan Monarchy, 137-139. 
 35 
party faded and the party’s stances became more moderate, making it a classic example of 
‘moderation through inclusion’.112 
The respective parties’ economic views 
When preparing for elections, a party has to outline its ideas in an electoral program. Evidently, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda have done so as well in the run up to the parliamentary elections 
of 2011-2012. The PJD, having freely participated in previous elections, had already presented 
several electoral programs prior to the Moroccan parliamentary elections of 2011. Given that the 
FJP and Ennahda finally had an excellent opportunity to openly present their economic views and 
the economic policies they envisioned and given that this was the most concise, yet also the most 
comprehensive channel through which they could communicate their vision to their electorate, I 
will use these electoral programs as primary references to highlight the various policy measures the 
parties were hoping to implement in the realm of economics. As far as the PJD is concerned, I will 
be more general, given that this party had already outlined its ideas and as these have already been 
scrutinized by several scholars. In doing so, I hope to arrive at an understanding what strategies 
these parties had developed for solving and improving the economic problems that were facing the 
respective countries. I will subsequently briefly discuss to what extent the envisioned measures 
coincide with or differ from the theoretical underpinnings of Islamic economics as described in the 
previous chapter and some of the caveats of the respective parties’ analyses.  
Freedom and Justice Party 
It is important to take into consideration that the Brotherhood had already had a parliamentary 
delegation of 88 members of parliament during the period 2005-2010. It had lost all except two 
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seats in the 2010 elections, which was one of the reasons why it supported the uprisings. In their 
2011 electoral program, the FJP takes pride in stating that one of the top priorities of these two MPs 
had been “putting the brakes on the privatization train”.113 After having analyzed the state of the 
Egyptian economy on the eve of the Revolution, the FJP’s vision for improving this precarious 
situation is presented. Among the most striking initiatives is the desire to achieve self-sufficiency in 
the production of some strategic commodities such as wheat,
114
 activate the role of small and micro 
enterprises in the country by modifying the law of protection of competition in order to prevent 
monopolistic practices, and last but not least encourage compliance with the obligation of zakat, 
encourage further charitable work and reform the national charitable trust system to provide 
continuous financing for the community.
115
 As far as the country’s financial situation is concerned, 
the FJP wants to gradually replace “usurious institutions and transactions” with “Islamic ones”.116  
As one might expect from a party with such a distinct role in the provision of social services
117
, the 
FJP strongly emphasizes social justice and the equitable distribution of revenues. In line with this, 
the party focuses on the issue of high prices, the elimination of poverty and unemployment, 
improvement of the living conditions of workers and peasants, and amending the tax law so as to 
adopt a system of progressive income taxes.
118
 They also express the desire to form trade unions for 
all disadvantaged groups, abolish the current trade unions law and create a new law allowing trade 
unions to manage their affairs independently from politics
119
 and moreover to support the advisory 
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role of trade unions and encourage further cooperation with the state
120
 so as to improve the 
conditions of workers,
121
 which was a key aspect of the revolution.  
At the same time and perhaps somewhat contradictory, the FJP wants to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate,
122
 eliminate obstacles hindering the private sector and increase Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI),
123
 realizing annual growth rates of 6.5-7 per cent.
124
 This is to be done, however, 
without privatizing strategic industries such as medicine, food, and energy.
125
 This may come as a 
surprise given the centrality of social justice in Islamist thought, however, when one considers that 
the party’s economic policies were designed by Khairat al-Shater, the Brotherhood’s most 
prominent senior figure and a multimillionaire businessman in his own right, the emphasis on a 
favorable investment climate and the elimination of obstacles hindering the private sector as 
requirements for attaining growth is quite understandable.
126
  
Ennahda 
The electoral program of Ennahda puts forward similar objectives, but takes it a step further in that 
intends “providing jobs for all Tunisian men and women, offering all the amenities of a dignified 
life, achieving balanced regional development and promoting investment in all economic 
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sectors”[my emphasis].127 To be sure, the economic content in Ennahda’s program is the most 
comprehensive of the three parties but is in essence the same as that of the FJP and the PJD.
.128
 
Faced with the demands of the revolution and given its Islamist tradition, the program naturally 
centers around employment, economic development and social justice. The party realizes that the 
structural trade deficit and its impact on Tunisia’s external debt represents one of the primary 
challenges for the government and severely hampers its ability to finance the projects it desires.
129
 
Public expenditures need to be limited and financed without increasing the country’s national 
debt.
130
 Furthermore, Ennahda strongly emphasizes the right of employees to associate and 
unionize, recognizes the right to strike and the independence of labor unions.
131
 
In line with the two other parties, Ennahda wants to attract investment and technical know-how in 
order to tilt the balance of unskilled in favor of skilled jobs and to accomplish this the party is 
willing to fundamentally review the country’s investment code.132 Ennahda also intends to engage 
in bilateral trade agreements with as many countries as possible and integrate Tunisia’s economy 
with those of its trading partners so as to increase the country’s growth and international 
competitiveness.
133
 The ultimate objective in this sequence of thoughts is for Tunisia to obtain a 
competitive advantage as an economy of knowledge and innovation.
134
 This might be feasible for 
the Maghreb, hence making Tunisia a local knowledge economy, but given that the bulk of the 
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country’s trade is with the EU135 one may wonder whether it would be possible to achieve this in 
the Mediterranean or even the wider Arab region.  
This does not prevent Ennahda from making optimistic macroeconomic forecasts; over the four 
year period from 2012-2016, the party hopes to create 590,000 jobs, reduce the unemployment rate 
to 8.5 per cent, realize growth rates averaging 7 per cent and raise per capita income with more than 
58 per cent.
136
 Then there is the party’s monetary and financial policy. The party wishes to turn 
Tunisia into “a regional financial center with international influence”.137 It also wants to further 
develop the position of Islamic banks. However, strengthening the Tunisian financial sector would 
have to occur through attracting “internationally renowned banks”.138  
Party for Justice and Development 
As stated above, the PJD had already participated in three elections before the 2011 elections and is 
fully committed to political participation.
139
 In 1997 and 2002, the party’s ideology was 
overwhelmingly Islamist, emphasizing the need for social justice, equity related issues and the 
provision of interest-free loans as well as expressing concerns about economic globalization.
140
 
Following the 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks, the party had to drastically tone down on its 
Islamist content and began to follow what Bouyahya calls the ‘Third Way’, which is quite similar to 
what is known as ‘social democracy’ in many Western European countries.141 In 2011, in the wake 
of the Arab Spring, the party again highlighted its Islamist stances.  
Another observation is that the emphasis on economic affairs is much lower in national than in 
municipal elections; in the latter, issues like social justice and employment are more prevalent than 
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in the former,
142
 and as Bouyahya demonstrates, matters related to economics, such as reducing 
inequality, fighting (economic) hegemony, or addressing the role of the state in the economy were 
of relatively minor importance on party congresses.
143
  
In the 2007 electoral program, which was influenced by technocrats brought in by party secretary 
general Saad Eddine Othmani, the PJD addressed socioeconomic matters in a more realistic way 
and moreover with more appreciation for the budgetary constraints that the party would inevitably 
face when desiring to actually govern the country. This program diverged significantly from the 
predominantly Islamist ones of the previous elections and resembled more closely the economic 
ideals of social democracy.
144
 The PJD lost the elections and Othmani was dismissed as secretary 
general during the 6
th
 party congress in 2008, in favor of Abdelilah Benkirane.  
In the run-up to the 2011 elections, the region was embroiled in the events of the Arab Spring and, 
given the events in Tunisia and Egypt, Islamism had come to the center of political activity. 
Unsurprisingly, the 2011 electoral program was once again predominantly Islamist, mentioning 
social justice, while also favoring capitalism, private property and emphasizing the virtues of the 
free market.
145
 By 2011, however, the PJD’s economic program had by and large become similar to 
that of all other Moroccan parties.
146
 The party has therefore become, in the eyes of many 
commentators, a neoliberal
147
 party, which emphasizes social justice solely through charity given 
by individuals and the trickle down mechanism.
148
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Some comments on the programs 
A major lacuna of the programs is the unfocused nature of the economic propositions, but 
especially the way they are to be implemented is extremely vague and ambiguous. Likewise, it 
appears that the programs were written without a clear understanding of the underlying mechanisms 
that determine the eventual outcome of the policy measures. Inflation, for example, is not an 
increase in the price level but refers to an increase in the money supply, meaning more currency 
chasing the same number of goods and services, as a result of which prices rise. It is therefore 
illogical and potentially disastrous to want to invest in “100 national projects (each exceeding a 
billion dollars),”149 increase wages and pensions and make the banking system loan out half a 
trillion Egyptian pounds,
150
 while at the same time wanting to drastically curb inflation. The same is 
true for Ennahda, whose program argues that the gradual rise in the growth rate will reduce inflation 
rates.
151
 All else equal, whenever an economy grows, either through domestic growth or through 
exports, the amount of currency in circulation will increase and as a result prices will rise. 
Moreover, the programs are very expensive, especially when we consider that the economic 
situation of the countries is quite precarious to begin with. Government budgets have proven 
insufficient to pay for a decent welfare state and will most likely continue to be so for years to 
come. This is an important finding because nowhere in the programs is there any reference to their 
feasibility or any confession that implementing the measures may prove difficult.  
It is likewise remarkable that interest free banking will exist parallel to conventional banking. One 
explanation for this is that it takes time to make the transition from interest based to interest free 
banking, but the PJD and Ennahda do not even mention the intention to make this switch. Another 
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point of contention is that Ennahda states that it expects 27 per cent of funds in the economy to 
consist of FDI and Islamic financial contracts with which to fund infrastructure and other large 
investment projects. As explained in chapter two, Islamic finance, which is explicitly mentioned in 
all three programs, requires some measure of profit and loss sharing, for it to qualify as an 
investment under mudaraba or musharaka. If not, projects will have to be repaid with a fixed mark-
up, which could very well mean that for instance newly constructed roads will require tolls and as 
such reduce real incomes of the people using them.
152
   
Moreover, a number of observers point to the pragmatism that has shaped Islamist parties’ ideology 
in order to adapt to the reality of the moment, meaning that Islamist ideology has become a rather 
fluid one.
153
 Especially the PJD lacks an explicit ideology and its viewpoints depend on the mood of 
the moment in order to optimally benefit from the popular sentiment.
154
 According to Wegner, this 
is due to the fact that the PJD has firmly established itself as an independent political party, 
completely independent of any movement to which it would owe accountability. This is also true 
for Ennahda, which has also been operating independent of any actor, however this party had not 
‘matured’ the way the PJD had and lacked political experience.155 
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     CHAPTER FOUR 
Islamist parties in power 
It will come as no surprise that the Islamist parties under study failed to deliver on many of the 
promises made during their electoral campaigns; political parties in all corners of the globe are 
forced to break many promises when confronted with the reality of politics, so why would this be 
any different in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia? However, when a party whose program–in 
contradiction to an obvious neoliberal frame of reference–emphasizes issues of redistribution and 
social equality continues the policies of the regimes it supposedly resists, and moreover sides with 
and even serves the same established elites, certain actors within (civil) society will inevitably begin 
to question the feasibility of the redistributive objectives this party supposedly wishes to achieve. 
This chapter will therefore provide an overview of the respective parties’ periods in power and will 
subsequently analyze these experiences in light of the research question provided in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis.  
Egypt 
The Egyptian parliamentary elections from November 2011 until January 2012 saw an overall 
turnout of 55 per cent.
156
 After Muhammad Morsi had been elected and sworn in as president, he 
appointed Hisham Qandil to be the country’s Prime Minister.  
A number of the Qandil government’s core ministerial posts relating to the economy were occupied 
by either former businessmen or men with close ties to influential businessmen. Regardless, they 
were in favor of measures that would facilitate the business and investment climate in Egypt. 
Osama Saleh, formerly the chairman of Egypt’s General Authority for Free Zones and Investment 
(GAFI), an organization concerned with regulating and facilitating (foreign and domestic) 
investment and likewise helping investors from all over the world to take advantage of business 
opportunities in Egypt, became the country’s minister of Investment. The post of minister of 
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Industry and Foreign Trade went to Hatem Saleh, who prior to accepting the position, had held key 
posts at companies like Proctor & Gamble and Unilever and had been the CEO of an agrifoods 
company, which was owned by the Middle East’s leading private equity firm Citadel Capitel of 
which Egyptian tycoon Ahmed Heikal is the chair.  
The same trend is observable for other economy related ministers–the minister of Tourism and the 
minister of Petroleum–who had risen to the highest rank in the sectors over which they would 
preside as ministers. Hisham Zazou, who had worked at Citibank for five years, had co-founded a 
tourist agency in the US targeting the Egyptian market, had headed the Egyptian Tourism 
Federation and had been the first Egyptian deputy at the World Tourism Organization’s business 
council would become Egypt’s minister of Tourism. Osama Kamal, the minister of Petroleum, had 
been the chairman of the Egyptian Petrochemicals Holding Company, which is part of the 
petroleum ministry and was charged with managing and developing Egypt’s petrochemicals 
industry.
157
 Last but not least, Khaled al-Azhary, one of only five ministers supplied by the FJP and 
a former deputy for the Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions (EFTU), was appointed minister of 
Manpower. The Egyptian Investors Federation had already expressed their contentment with the 
inauguration of “qualified and experienced” ministers that would be good for the country’s 
investment climate when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) had appointed similar 
people for such ministerial posts.
158
   
However, the Qandil government was severely hampered by the precarious situation of the 
Egyptian economy inherited from the days of Mubarak and the SCAF, who during their sixteen 
months in power had done very little to resolve the economic difficulties facing the country. SCAF 
had refused to enter into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
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Bank (WB) in June 2011–an agreement that was quite lenient from the latter’s point of view–with 
SCAF calling the latter “an affront to national sovereignty,”159 meaning that Egypt’s balance of 
payment situation would deteriorate even further. Indeed, under SCAF the budget deficit had risen 
from 8 per cent of GDP in 2010 to nearly 11 per cent in 2011. It would eventually exceed 13 
percent under the Morsi presidency.
160
 Due to the political instability that ensued after the ousting 
of Mubarak and the election of an Islamist dominated parliament, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
as well as the number of tourists coming to Egypt fell dramatically, which meant that foreign 
reserves became increasingly more scarce. As the Egyptian pound depreciated rapidly against the 
US dollar, the currency in which most of the country’s imports are measured, it became more 
expensive and hence more difficult for Egypt to import what it needed, which in turn affected 
millions of predominantly poor and middle class families.
161
 This means that the chain of events 
following the revolution had an adverse and downward spiraling effect on the already precarious 
situation that had caused the revolution to occur in the first place. It should come as no surprise that 
the situation deteriorated even further under Morsi and the Qandil government with unemployment 
rising to a situation where one in eight Egyptians was unemployed and industrial growth rates, 
which had oscillated between five and seven per cent prior to the revolution, stagnating at one per 
cent.
162
  
It is for this reason that in the spring of 2012, after the FJP had been elected into parliament, SCAF 
together with a number of delegates from the FJP, under the guidance of Khairat al-Shater–the man 
who had directed the FJP’s economic program and had likewise been the visionary behind the 
Brotherhood’s earlier mentioned ‘Nahda Project’–met with the IMF to discuss the possibility for a 
$3.2 billion loan, with al-Shater stating that applying for loans from international financial 
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institutions (IFIs) was “no longer a matter of choice”.163 This represented only a fraction of the $12 
billion that was needed to avoid bankruptcy and there was no doubt, neither in the eyes of the 
lenders nor as far as the FJP was concerned, that the package would result in painful austerity 
measures being imposed on the already “imploded” Egyptian economy. 164  In summary, the 
economic situation the FJP and president Morsi inherited from the Mubarak regime and the SCAF 
was abysmal and the political reality put severe constraints on the former’s ability to implement its 
already overly ambitious plan for the Egyptian economy.  
The Brotherhood had stated in its electoral program that it wanted to stimulate (investment from) 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). However, rather than actively strive towards more 
inclusion of SMEs, senior Brotherhood members Khairat al-Shater and Hassan Malek––both 
millionaires, longtime business partners, and in the words of political scientist Joshua Stacher, the 
Brotherhood’s “neoliberal face”––embarked to launch the Egyptian Business Development 
Association (EBDA).
165
 This association, also referred to as the Brotherhood’s “business wing”, is 
based on the Turkish Müsiad, which is closely linked to the inner circle of the AKP, the political 
party that has ruled Turkey for the past fifteen years. Its primary goals are to develop the private 
sector with an emphasis on small and medium enterprises and, according to its founder Hassan 
Malek, seeks to promote “openness, values and bilateral trade between nations”.166  
Upon closer investigation, however, one finds that the parties affiliated with EBDA belong to the 
same group of cronies that ruled Egypt during the Mubarak era, in addition to a new business elite 
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of Brotherhood affiliated businessmen. In fact, there is a striking correlation between being part of 
the infitah elite under Mubarak and the business oligarchy in the period following the Revolution.
167
 
During the Morsi presidency, this elite was accompanied by a number of businessmen related to the 
Brotherhood who tried to consolidate their grip on Egypt’s economy by establishing business 
networks such as EBDA.
168
 Small and medium enterprises were thus excluded from the post-
uprising economic reality in Egypt whereas the ones benefiting from it were largely the same elites 
that had benefited from the economic liberalization under Mubarak.  
Another major contrast between the promises outlined in the FJP’s electoral program and the 
party’s actual policies concerns the position of workers and labor unions and the improvements in 
working conditions and wages. As outlined before, poverty had risen significantly during the last 
decade of the Mubarak regime–under the infamous ‘cabinet of technocrats’ headed by Ahmed Nazif 
from 2004 until the uprisings–and several notable scholars have argued that the revolution was 
primarily inspired by workers’ grievances during this period–the number of demonstrations had 
never been as high as during the final years of the Mubarak regime, a trend that would continue 
after the revolution and during the Morsi presidency
169–and were initiated by workers and labor 
activists.
170
  
As outlined in their program, the FJP promised to amend Law No. 35 of 1976 and Law No. 12 of 
1995 in a way that would increase the freedom of trade unions and argued that this measure was 
intended against the fragmentation of trade unions and hence as a means of strengthening them. 
However, the reality of the matter was quite different. Law No. 35 of 1976 was altered, but not to 
the extent that would have made a significant impact, and Law No. 12 of 1995 was not altered at 
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all.
171
 Moreover, Law 12 of 2003, which the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions 
(EFITU) wanted to see amended, was not mentioned nor altered by the FJP.
172
 Moreover, the 
EFITU–Egypt’s largest labor union which had been at the center of the protests ousting Hosni 
Mubarak–continued to face repression.  
After having been elected president, Mohammed Morsi issued seventeen pledges that he vowed to 
honor as president. These included his intention to serve the best interests of among others workers 
and other vulnerable groups in society, however without elaborating on its practical aspects. His 
promise to uphold the freedom to demonstrate and the right to peaceful protest was just as 
ambiguous given that it came with the restriction that such actions would have to occur “without 
compromising the interests of the nation, disrupting production, damaging private property or 
harming the public,”173 which can obviously be used as an excuse to curb this right at any time.  
The Brotherhood has (repeatedly) stated on its website that it was keen to safeguard workers' rights 
and the independence of trade union action.
174
 However, and more disconcertingly, after the 
elections the Brotherhood’s website featured “hundreds of articles” that warn against the dangers of 
striking and civil disobedience and outline how this could result in chaos and the collapse of the 
state.
175
 Independent trade unionists have complained about the intimidation faced when 
demonstrating against the government’s labor policies, both of which–the repression under Morsi 
and the government’s labor policies–they argue are much worse than under Mubarak.176  
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Under the Morsi presidency, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), which had been 
coopted by the old regime as far back as 1957 and had been dissolved by the SCAF but was later 
revived, and was the primary enemy of the EFITU, was infiltrated by leading Brotherhood 
members, providing the Brotherhood with union legitimacy. For instance, in February 2012 the FJP 
together with ETUF officials were working together on draft legislation that would supposedly 
expand the freedoms of trade unions.
177
 These efforts, however, merely served to control the efforts 
of independent labor unions and include them in the bureaucratic system, precisely as had been the 
case under Mubarak. In fact, it would strengthen the primacy of the ETUF and would have meant 
that all union activities would be controlled by it. According to the draft, workers who left ETUF-
affiliated unions would lose access to their deposits in ETUF-administered social funds. The law 
would give employers the right to prevent trade union activities and elections and the latter would 
only be allowed if it did not “affect the course of work in the institution”. Trade unionists convicted 
of “spreading false information” could be fined LE10,000, while employers harassing trade-
unionists would only be given a LE1,000 fine.
178
  
Not only did the law therefore clearly favor employers’ rights over those of workers, it also served 
as a means to discourage workers from seeking independence from government affiliated unions. 
The Muslim Brotherhood dominated parliament envisioned a system where workers’ rights and 
demands would be secured through government affiliated organizations and not by civil society 
actors such as independent unions. Moreover, the Brotherhood gained privileged access to the main 
mechanism of control over the nominations for the workers’ seats within these unions as well as 
those nominated for workers’ seats in parliament, through its partnership with the ruling party 
within the leadership of the ETUF. It therefore secured that whoever was selected to ‘represent’ 
workers would already have had to accommodate to the Brotherhood’s aversion to strikes and 
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workers’ protests.179 Furthermore, the Brotherhood began to present itself as an organization that 
was in negotiations with striking workers, apparently as a PR campaign, but was reluctant to receive 
workers and their demands when the latter came to parliament on their own initiative. In other 
words, the Brotherhood appropriated itself the agency to engage in discussions with (striking) 
workers as it saw fit but refused to grant that same right to the people it ostensibly represented.
180
  
As far as minimum wages were concerned – a matter that the FJP had made one of the pillars of its 
electoral program and one of the key elements through which social justice was to be achieved – the 
Ministry of Finance under the Qandil government stated that the minimum wage would increase 
from LE700 to LE1200 over a five year period. This initiative, however, was vehemently rejected 
by many given that such an increase had already been called for by the Center for Economic and 
Social Rights prior to the uprisings and given the inflation rates in Egypt this increase would have 
evaporated when implemented five years into the future. There were therefore powerful calls by 
civil society actors to increase the minimum wage – for both public and private sector workers – to 
LE1200 right away. The FJP, however, argued that wages should only increase when laborers’ 
productivity increases.
181
  
During the first six months of the Morsi presidency, there had been little signs that the situation of 
‘ordinary’ Egyptians was likely to change. No minimum and maximum wage nor a progressive 
taxation system had been implemented, issues that had been key themes during the election 
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campaigns.
182
 Moreover, strikes calling for higher salaries in order to cope with the deteriorating 
living conditions were met with harsh repression by police forces.
183
  
Adding fuel to fire, the Qandil government decided to cut subsidies on a number of primary 
necessities which further eroded real incomes. Just as had been the case during the ‘bread riots’ of 
1977, the decision to implement austerity measures to secure a $4.8 billion IMF loan sparked 
immediate outrage among working and middle-class Egyptians who demanded that the measure be 
revoked. As the measure disproportionately targeted the poorest segments of Egyptian society, this 
move was the straw that broke the camel’s back for many who had grown increasingly disgruntled 
with Morsi, who had started his period in office with statements insisting on social justice.
184
 This 
move is particularly interesting when one considers that the FJP had explicitly stated that it would 
not resort to foreign loans and grants until feasibility studies and necessary preparations for 
implementation had been completed.
185
 This move by the government, combined with the lack of 
legislation on minimum wages
186
 and a law restricting the right of demonstrations resulted in ever 
more vocal popular protests against the Morsi presidency with the International Development 
Centre ranking Egypt first in the world when it came to public protests, averaging 44 such protests 
per day by the spring of 2013.
187
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Tunisia 
With a voter turnout of just under 52 per cent,
188
 the October 2011 Tunisian Constituent Assembly 
elections saw Ennahda come to power in a ‘troika’ coalition with the liberal left–the Congrès pour 
la République headed by future president Moncef Marzouki and the Democratic Forum for Labor 
and Liberties, whose Arabic acronym spells Ettakatol–with Ennahda winning 37% of the votes, 
making it the biggest party by far.
189
 Hamadi Jebali was appointed prime minister and on December 
20, 2011 he presented his cabinet.  
Naturally, Ennahda occupied most (and the most important) ministerial positions, such as the 
minister of Justice, minister of the Interior and minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as the most 
important posts related to the economy. The party supplied the minister of Industry and Commerce 
(Mohamed Lamine Chakhari), the minister of Investment and International Cooperation (Riadh 
Bettaieb), and the minister for Economy (Ridha Saidi). It therefore seems that some of the most 
sovereign portfolios went to senior Ennahda members who were lacking the qualifications for such 
positions.
190
 Houssine Dimassi of Ettakatol would become the minister of Finance. He had been a 
member of the General Tunisian Union of Labor (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail, UGTT) 
prior to securing the post and was affiliated with the Workers’ Organization.191 On July 27, 2012 he 
resigned due to disagreements with the government on matters related to political economy and 
social and monetary policy, after which he was succeeded by Slim Besbes of Ennahda.
192
 The party, 
therefore, had control over all the important ministries related to the nation’s economy, was by far 
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the most influential party in parliament and supplied the Prime Minister; if there ever was a chance 
to realize the desired policies, this was it.  
The economic situation inherited from the Ben Ali regime was a dreadful one. As already discussed 
in Chapter One, the precarious economic situation Tunisia found itself in was caused by two 
decades of structural adjustment policies implemented by the former regime at the behest of the 
international financial institutions (IFIs). The Jebali government took office with an unemployment 
rate standing between fifteen and twenty percent with youth unemployment at thirty per cent.
193
 
Policies by the Ben Ali regime had secured a steady flow of FDI to the country, but these 
investments were focused on low value added, low wage and labor intensive activities such as 
textile production, which required little skilled labor.
194
 Given that Tunisia has a relatively well-
educated labor force, this resulted in a disproportionately high number of recent graduates to be 
unemployed.
195
 However, Ennahda, with its rhetoric of social justice, did not deviate from this 
model in any meaningful way and continued to adhere to the neoliberal policies of the former 
regime.
196
 
Due to uncertainty over the country’s political future, foreign investors were reluctant to invest, 
which further limited growth, and increasingly forced the government to turn to Persian Gulf 
countries for funds.
197
 Ennahda proudly stated on its Facebook page that it had secured a $500 
million grant from Qatar as well as a guarantee that 50,000 Tunisians would be given jobs in the 
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Gulf.
198
 It also stated that it had successfully convinced the German government to convert a $75 
million debt into investments in Tunisian infrastructure.
199
  
On June 7, 2013 Ennahda signed an agreement with the IMF, ensuring that Tunisia would have to 
continue along the path of austerity and macroeconomic stabilization that had proven so disastrous 
before.
200
 The negotiations with the IMF were conducted without  public discussion in the 
Constituent Assembly, in spite of considerable hostility to the IMF by several civil society groups 
within the country.
201
 
The Jebali government knew from the start what an agreement with the IMF would mean in terms 
of austerity and deregulation of the labor market. Already in June 2011, the World Bank board had 
agreed to supply Tunisia with a $1.3 billion donor package on terms that differed little from the 
latter’s usual demands and required the government to promote competition and improve the 
business climate.
202
 Another requirement was that Tunisia had to implement a series of 
“comprehensive and politically sensitive reforms” aimed at deregulating the labor code and 
increasing labor market flexibility.
203
  
Interestingly, as part of promoting “social and economic inclusion” and partly as a result of the 
aversion to IFIs and their actions in the past in many countries around the world, IFIs have turned to 
a vehicle called Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) instead of relying exclusively on private actors 
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to guide the investment projects in recipient countries. As the name suggests, a PPP is a financial 
contract where a private entity finances, constructs, or manages a project in exchange for a series of 
payments from the government of the respective country. Some of the characteristics of PPPs are 
the sharing of risks and the construction of long term relationships between the public and private 
sectors in a country.
204
 Despite strong criticism in parliament, where fears were expressed that 
allowing foreign companies to take over the core sectors of the economy while at the same 
increasing the country’s indebtedness would be disastrous for the country and its people, the 
Ennahda-led government stated that a PPP law was a requirement from foreign donors and that it 
would continue to support PPPs through ministerial decree if necessary.
205
 Minister of Economy 
Ridha Saïdi claimed that a PPP law was of vital importance for future investments and growth and 
urged future governments not to break with this principle.
206
 Evidently, Ennahda’s enthusiasm for 
PPPs was not due to their risk sharing element, something that could have been explained by 
referring to the views held by theorists of Islamic economics, but was rather on the basis that it 
would attract investments from IFIs. As could be expected, annual cash flows to the IFIs would be 
realized by cutbacks to subsidies, raises in consumer taxes, and increases in electricity, gas and fuel 
prices as well as a salary freeze for civil service workers among others, which further reduces real 
incomes of working and middle class Tunisians in a context of high unemployment and high 
inflation rates.
207
  
Tax progressivity in Tunisia has been improved by adding two groups to the high-income category, 
however, the income exemption level–annual income not exceeding TND1500–has not been 
changed, in spite of campaign promises that it would.
208
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Civil society actors of all kinds had been at the center of the demonstrations that toppled the 
regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, but one actor stands out in particular. The Union Générale 
Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), Tunisia’s powerful labor union, had been the motor behind the 
Tunisian Revolution if only for the way it had mobilized demonstrators during the years prior to the 
uprisings.
209
 Under Ben Ali, the UGTT had successfully lobbied to implement the structural 
adjustment programs gradually, thereby protecting jobs.
210
 Ennahda, however, requested that the 
UGTT abstain from interfering in matters of politics and “preserve its independence”.211 After these 
verbal attacks were complemented with physical ones, the UGTT hardened its stance against 
Ennahda. This sparked the beginning of enmity and distrust between the former, which argued that 
the Islamists wanted to silence and intimidate organized labor as well as downplay its role in the 
revolution,
212
 and the latter which, after a series of demonstrations, argued that the UGTT had been 
“manipulated by elements of the former regime who wanted to undermine the new government”.213 
Ennahda’s–or any Islamist party’s–aversion to syndicalism stems from the historic rivalries 
between the two groups. From the late 1970s onwards, when Islamism became a genuine force on 
the political stage, the only group that could mobilize large groups of people and could rival the 
Islamists were the leftists and organized labor in particular.
214
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During their period in power, Ennahda therefore tried to marginalize the UGTT in several ways. On 
its Facebook page, the party expressed its hostility to all things syndicalist.
215
 Likewise, on its 
official website, one can find a number of accusations against the UGTT.
216
 Given the democratic 
rhetoric espoused by Ennahda, it could not outlaw organized labor; it therefore attempted to 
blacklist and contain it, in a sense mimicking the approach adopted by the Ben Ali regime.
217
 Like 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda tried to include less powerful unions, such as the UTT, 
into union activities, while at the same time attempting to infiltrate the UGTT.
218
 Again like the 
Brotherhood, Ennahda unambiguously expressed its aversion to strikes and other escalations “that 
would obstruct the interests of citizens and undermine the national economy”.219 
In addition to this, several commentators have argued that Ennahda lacked an economic program 
that could provide solutions to the problems it was facing, something already discussed in the 
previous chapter.
220
 Not only was Ennahda’s program too incoherent and optimistic, but the party 
had absolutely no idea how to turn it into practice. Overwhelmed by the complexity and constraints 
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imposed by the political reality, the party soon found itself reacting rather than acting.
221
 As the 
promises of progress and employment were not realized, resentment with the party increased, both 
on the street as well as by the opposition in parliament.
222
 After the government attempted to 
implement the austerity measures demanded by the IMF, protests emerged in early 2013.
223
 The 
UGTT was at the center of these demonstrations and accused Ennahda of selling the country to the 
IMF without delivering on its promises of securing social justice and jobs for Tunisians.
224
 After 
two vocal critics of Ennahda’s economic policies–Chokri Belaid and Mohammed Brahmi–were 
assassinated, Ennahda’s situation became unbearable and in October 2013 Ennahda agreed to hand 
over power to a caretaker government after which a government of technocrats was installed who, 
in spite of new protests, implemented the demands of the IMF to the delight of the latter.
225
 
Morocco 
In the November 25, 2011 Moroccan parliamentary elections, the PJD won a plurality of 27 per 
cent of the votes, although less than half of those eligible to vote actually did.
226
 Abdelilah 
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Benkirane, the secretary general of the PJD, formulated a conservative government with the Istiqlal 
Party and the Popular Movement, and became the country’s Prime Minister.227  
As argued before, the PJD had since its inception embraced liberal values in matters of economics, 
emphasizing its support for private property and individual initiative, as well as reducing the role of 
the state. Social justice ought to be realized primarily through individual actions at times 
complemented by government schemes of redistribution.
228
 Moreover, resistance against the 
international economic hegemony diminished over time. The PJD had expressed worries about 
economic globalization in the past and had criticized the Moroccan government for being “minions 
of the secularized West” doing the bidding of their “foreign bosses” the IMF and the World 
Bank.
229
  
When in power, however, the PJD quickly realized that being in power changes the rules of the 
game.
230
 The first Benkirane government was characterized by the implementation of an austerity 
program–in exchange for a $6.2 billion precautionary line of credit from the IMF–and World Bank 
disbursement levels to Morocco reached record heights in 2011 and 2012. In order for these funds 
to be granted, emphasis was placed on the promotion of PPPs within key sectors. The new 
constitution adopted in 2011 requires that state finances remain in balance (Article 77) and the 
constitution hence embedded the demand that the government should aim for the reduction of 
government spending on wages and subsidies. The IMF and World Bank had assisted at least 
indirectly in the drafting of this legislation and would thus be ensured of repayment on its PPP 
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initiatives.
231
 While it is true that the new constitution was passed before the PJD came to power, 
the latter approved of the constitutional reforms and encouraged their supporters to vote in favor of 
the proposed changes, as did all other major political parties.
232
 In exchange for their support the 
IMF demanded that the government enforced “rationalization and efficiency of spending” through 
measures including subsidy and pension reforms, removal of barriers to business entry, reduce 
tariffs, deregulate the labor market and prepare some public enterprises for privatization
233
  In June 
2012, the PJD-led government increased fuel prices by 20 per cent and in September 2012 food 
subsidies were reduced by 15 per cent.
234
   
Morocco has since 1941 had a so-called ‘Compensation Fund’ (caisse de compensation) which 
subsidized primary necessities to maintain the purchasing power of citizens. Criticized by 
institutions like the IMF, the Benkirane II government drastically reduced the subsidies given by the 
fund from MAD53 billion in 2012–representing one quarter of the total government budget–to 
MAD23 billion in 2015.
235
 When asked how he could reconcile this and other austerity measures 
such as reducing pensions with his party program Benkirane replied that faced with Morocco’s 
precarious economic situation, ideology is not something that should be referred to.
236
 
According to Benkirane, many of the promises made in the 2011 electoral campaign have been met. 
He argues that FDI to Morocco has increased significantly–from MAD26 billion in 2011 to 
                                                 
231
 Cammett et al. A Political Economy of the Middle East, 304; World Bank, “Country Partnership Strategy Progress 
Report for the Period FY10–13,” 15 May, 2012, accessed 27 May, 2017, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/05/21/000333037_20120521001658/Rendered
/PDF/676940CAS0R2010se0Only090Box369244B.pdf, 8.  
232
 “Morocco Approves Constitutional Reforms,” CNN.com, 1 July, 2011, accessed 27 May, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/07/01/morocco.vote.reforms/.  
233
 IMF, “Morocco Letter of Intent,” 27 July, 2012, accessed 22 May, 2017, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2012/mar/072712.pdf, 3; IMF, “Morocco: Request for an Arrangement under the 
Precautionary and Liquidity Line,” 28 July, 2012, accessed 9 May, 2017, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12239.pdf, 2, 11. 
234
 Hanieh, “Shifting Priorities or Business as Usual?,” 128-129; Béchir Lakani, “Le gouvernement marocain revoit à la 
hausse le prix des carburants,” L’économiste maghrébin, 28 September, 2013, accessed 27 May, 2017, 
http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2013/09/28/le-gouvernement-marocain-revoit-a-la-hausse-le-prix-des-
carburants/; http://telquel.ma/2014/07/15/nouvelle-hausse-du-prix-du-gasoil_1409595.   
235
 “Benkirane: je suis là pour réformer et j’ai confiance en l’intelligence du peuple Marocain,” PJD.ma, 24 October, 
2014, accessed 27 May, 2017, http://www.pjd.ma/fr/actualites/benkirane-je-suis-là-pour-réformer-et-j’ai-confiance-en-
l’intelligence-du-peuple-marocain.   
236
 Ibid. 
 61 
MAD39.6 billion in 2013 and that public debt has decreased from 80 to 63.5 per cent of GDP.
237
 
While (indirect) taxes have increased and subsidies under the Compensation Fund had been 
hollowed out, a move that has impacted the lives of millions of Moroccans, corporate tax rates have 
been reduced. What has not been reduced is the unemployment rate, which among young 
Moroccans still stands at 30 per cent and which has led to almost weekly protests by unemployed 
workers in front of the nation’s parliament.238 The party refuses to respond to questions concerning 
the country’s persistent unemployment problem, instead sustaining the neoliberal idea that the 
“private sector” (le tissu privé) will absorb this excess of manpower as the number of businesses 
grows and that it will furthermore have to be complemented by training people “more in line with 
market demands”. 239  Especially the latter will be particularly difficult to realize given the 
government’s continuous pressure on education budgets.240 In the articles I examined on the PJD’s 
own website, as well as those in the Moroccan press, there is no mention of how the party intends to 
redistribute the gains obtained through the supposed ‘successes’ of the Benkirane cabinets. One gets 
the impression that the PJD assumes it will occur through the trickle-down mechanism, given its 
ceaseless emphasis on its achievements in attracting FDI and realizing promising growth rates for 
the Moroccan economy. The only other channel through which this would occur, based on the 
party’s electoral program and comments in the media, is through zakat and other individual 
charitable donations. 
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Although satisfied in part by the concessions granted in April 2011, in which significant increases 
in wages and pensions were negotiated,
241
 Morocco’s trade unions were far from satisfied with the 
way the Benkirane government proceeded. During the latter’s first year in power, some remarked 
that the new government’s policies had been no different from those of previous governments, but 
that it was too soon to judge.
242
 Given the country’s complicated economic situation, many had 
anticipated that austerity measures would have to be implemented, but trade unions expected the 
government to respect the concessions reached under the ‘social dialogue’.243 As the Benkirane 
government demonstrated its reluctance to put these demands before the austerity measures 
demanded by the IFIs, the country’s trade unions decided to act. Strikes were prepared in 2014 and 
2015 to illustrate the capacity of the unions to paralyze the country, as they had done prior to the 
initiation of the ‘social dialogue’ in April 2011. The second Benkirane government responded that 
striking is a right but declared that these unions, some of which were linked to political parties and 
served “political agendas”, had no reason at all to strike.244 
After having read dozens of publications on the PJD’s own website as well as many articles in 
Moroccan periodicals, it becomes clear that the Benkirane I and II governments wholeheartedly 
supported the measures they imposed. For example, the PJD defended PPP agreements with 
international financial institutions (IFIs) as being alliances “to enrich the economy and provide 
citizens with competitive and quality services,” which merely represent “a transitional phase 
towards a sustainable, future-oriented solution.”245 Benkirane argued that although painful these 
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reforms are necessary, they are accepted by the population and trade unions who “know that the 
government is committed to preserve the purchasing power of the most vulnerable”.246 Likewise, 
the PJD highlighted on its website that the “progress made in the implementation of economic and 
financial reforms to strengthen growth, reduce social and spatial disparities and consolidate the 
macroeconomic framework” is to be admired.247 There is therefore ample reason to assume that the 
PJD fully supports neoliberal logic and that future governments of which the party is a member will 
continue to implement similar policies as during the cabinets Benkirane I and II. 
Economic Liberalism or Social Justice?  
After having analyzed the electoral programs of the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party, Tunisia’s 
Ennahda Party and the Moroccan Justice and Development Party, as well as on the basis of their 
period in power, it becomes obvious that these three parties have all professed as well as practiced 
neoliberal policies. At the same time, these parties have all made references to the need to 
redistribute the proceeds of economic endeavor equally among all members of society and have 
moreover, in light of the events that led to the Arab Uprisings of 2011, promised to deliver on the 
demands for ‘bread’, which I interpret as steady access to nutrition at an affordable price and ‘social 
justice’, which I perceive as a reduction of the prominence of the (deep) state in many sectors of the 
economy, equal treatment of all irrespective of one’s socioeconomic position, and a solution to the 
chronic unemployment that has plagued the region. Without wanting to sound polemical, I think 
this thesis has demonstrated that the respective parties have failed in this regard.      
The Islamist parties have justified their neoliberal mindset by arguing that the benefits of economic 
growth, measured in the annual increase in the monetary value of the total number of goods and 
services produced in a country in a year, would automatically find their way into the pockets of the 
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population. It is for this reason that the parties did not in principle object to the ‘unpopular’ 
deregulation requests demanded by international financial institutions in exchange for loans or 
funding for investment projects, often supplied in the form of so-called Public Private Partnerships. 
Increasing the price of certain primary necessities in addition to the cutting of subsidies on a 
number of other products, reducing pensions and wages of public sector employees and extensively 
deregulating the labor market was justified on the basis that in the future–it is good that languages 
have a future tense, for otherwise the bulk of the articles that I accessed could not have been 
written–it would all pay off and everyone would get their share.  
Aside from the trickle-down mechanism, the other main channel through which the parties have 
justified their enthusiasm for neoliberal policies is their faith in redistribution through zakat and 
other means of sadaqa or voluntary individual charity, which takes up a prominent position in the 
economic vision of Islamists. The implied logic is the same as with the trickling down of economic 
growth. As the economy grows and people gradually grow wealthier, people have more disposable 
income and therefore the absolute monetary value given as charity will increase. This means that 
more people are able to give alms and charity, while simultaneously the overall number of poor will 
decrease, meaning that the available funds will be distributed among fewer individuals. For this to 
occur, however, the Islamists count on the individual piety or taqwa of the one donating. In the 
source material published by the parties that I studied but also in the work of earlier pioneers of 
Islamist (economic) thought, for instance the thinkers studied in chapter two of this thesis, it is 
highlighted that in order for this mechanism to work individuals have to be virtuous, but also be 
financially able to do so; if not then the whole premise is futile, as explained in Chapter Two. As 
was also addressed in Chapter Two, this ‘recycling’ of funds by wealthier members of society to 
less affluent ones ensures that there is a steady stream of cash flowing to the poor and the needy and 
that as such the classical role attributed to the state in for instance Socialist thought–as price setter 
and distributor of goods of primary necessity–is less necessary.  
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Given the difficult economic situation the countries found and still find themselves in, governments 
have been forced to turn to international financial institutions, whose decades long emphasis on 
neoliberal reforms–the infamous ‘structural adjustment policies–was the primary cause of the 
respective countries’ economic situation on the eve of the uprisings. The Islamist governments 
therefore (had to) continue to implement austerity measures in line with the wishes of these 
institutions, which has meant that ordinary people simply could not afford to spend the desired 
amounts in individual charity. The combined effect of these measures has been that the poorest 
members of society–the potential receivers of alms and simultaneously the ones experiencing the 
largest relative drop in real income–have been most adversely affected. The Islamist philosophy 
behind the promise to ensure ‘bread’ and ‘social justice’, therefore, seems to have failed to deliver 
on its promises. In this regard, it seems that the Marxist critique of Islamists, which accuses them of 
not really catering to the necessities of the working class and hence accuses them of not being 
revolutionary, but merely providing false consciousness, appears to be true. In the words of Samir 
Amin, instead of challenging the system that is responsible for the detriment of Muslims in the 
world “on the terrain of the real social issues, political Islam aligns itself with the camp of 
dependent capitalism and dominant imperialism.”248   
However, there is more to this failure than meets the eye. The Islamists have demonstrated to want 
to change the traditional role of civil society actors as counterweights to political forces. Regarding 
organized labor, for instance, the Islamist parties in the three countries, though more aggressively in 
Egypt and Tunisia than in Morocco, have attempted to marginalize the role played by such 
organizations after the former complained about the lack of legislation to ensure that the protestors’ 
demands for social justice were realized. As has been argued earlier in this chapter, Islamist 
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intimidation of unions was not limited to verbal aggression, but increasingly turned violent as the 
former’s (period in) power matured. In other words, after the Islamists had been voted into office 
and as their electorate as well as those who had been skeptical towards them from the beginning 
began to question their intentions or at least their efficacy in realizing the set goals–as exemplified 
by the increasing number of demonstrations during the post-election period–the Islamists argued 
that demonstrations or other expressions of public disapproval of their policies would only further 
harm the economy and individual businesses in particular. Civil society actors would hence have to 
retreat from their traditional position and leave the realization of economic growth along neoliberal 
lines as well as the simultaneous realization of the social demands of the protestors to Islamist-led 
governments. The parties demanded that civil society limit itself to the apolitical aspects of societal 
life and appear to want to condemn the latter to a life in the shadows of political parties. When in 
power, the Islamists thus attempted to consolidate their power at the expense of their old rivals, 
organized labor, by either dismissing their role as the voice of workers or by trying to coopt and 
infiltrate them to provide union legitimacy to their proposed labor policies. The lack of perceived 
representation by the political system makes the marginalization of civil society actors by (Islamist) 
political parties all the more worrisome as these groups have been at the forefront of social 
struggles for decades and have, so it seems, actually represented the people’s concerns and have 
actively defended issues related to social justice for decades. 
How then, do we explain the divergent aftermath of the experiments in the three countries? The 
Muslim Brotherhood has been decimated since the coup d’état that deposed Muhammad Morsi 
from the presidency in July 2013 and no longer plays any political role. Ennahda lost the 2014 
elections, but was not given a final blow and may very well reposition itself as a political force in 
future elections. The PJD in turn has not only remained Morocco’s largest party but has moreover 
increased its number of seats in parliament by 18 during the elections of October 2016 and appears 
to have secured a broad electoral base on which to build for future elections. Given that the policies 
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of all three parties have by and large been the same, what can explain the ‘success’ of the PJD and 
the failure of Ennahda?
249
  
Before answering this question, one has to consider that confidence in the political system has 
traditionally been terribly low in the region in general as can be inferred from the fact that 51.7 and 
45 percent of those eligible to vote actually bothered to show up in the 2011 parliamentary elections 
in Tunisia and Morocco respectively and that this issue of ‘representation’ has arguably worsened 
since.
250
 This begs the question to what extent the political system – any political system – truly 
represents the people. As Mohamed Daidaa, a Moroccan syndicalist, argues “what does the PJD 
with its 1.2 million votes represent, when there are 2 million invalid ballots and 7 million 
Moroccans of voting age who are not even registered on the electoral roll? The electoral system 
fails to produce a strong party. Instead, one finds oneself with the sum of several programs that are 
insipid and impossible to realize”.251 The ‘Revolutionary mindset’ prevalent among millions of 
ecstatic Tunisians may have created hopes that were too high to be realized. When the Islamists of 
Ennahda subsequently failed to materialize on these demands, and as the party was furthermore 
discredited through its controversial relationship with the powerful UGTT as well as the public 
perception that the party may have had something to do with the assassination of two of its most 
vocal critics, the people targeted their anger with the political and economic status quo on the party 
and voted them out of power. In Morocco, where confidence in the political system has historically 
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been very low, the PJD had already established itself as an established political force – one that had 
by now become ‘makhzenized’ – and was no different in the eyes of the public than other political 
parties. Moreover, the PJD – as well as other Islamist parties – had their electoral base among the 
middle classes, which, it seems reasonable to assume, had less to complain about government 
policy than did the poor. It is reasonable to assume, as Bouyahya argues, that the PJD’s electorate 
supports the party on the basis of its support for conservative policies emphasizing the importance 
of traditional religious values within society and the family and that its emphasis on individual 
initiative and support for free markets is of additional but not primary concern. Moreover, as 
Youssef Belal has argued, the marginalized in society might just as well vote for left-wing parties or 
Istiqlal as for Islamist ones.
252
 It is therefore difficult to gauge who the impoverished members of 
society have voted for, assuming that they voted in the first place. In conclusion, it seems that 
Ennahda’s electoral defeat in 2014 was a direct result of its inability to deliver on its promises of 
improving the country’s economic situation, but that the PJD’s victory was not necessarily linked to 
its economic policies.  
It is poignant that Olivier Roy predicted ‘the failure of political Islam’ as early as 1992 and now, 25 
years later, he appears to have been right on almost every point. Islamism has indeed not been able 
to “offer an economic alternative or deeply transform society”253 nor been able to move beyond a 
neoliberal model “constrained to follow the prescriptions of the IMF”. 254  I contend that it is 
impossible to implement the ‘moral’ economy as envisaged by the theorists of Islamic economics in 
the current economic context in which neoliberal logic and deregulation policies enforced by 
international financial institutions are so dominant. The ‘moral’ economy therefore remains a theory 
that may only be put into practice in the context of a small, localized economy unaffected by the 
forces of the international economic system.  
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The term ‘false consciousness’ thus still applies to Islamism, but with one addition, namely that the 
Muslim world has actually witnessed its impotence. In 2003, Graham Fuller argued that Islamism 
has replaced nationalism and socialism as the mass ideology of the late-20
th
 and early 21
st
 century 
and Assef Bayat has since argued that we have entered the post-Islamist era.
255
 I concede that it is 
too soon to argue that either of these is the case, as many people evidently still do support Islamist 
parties–including the emergent Salafist currents in several countries across the region–but that it 
certainly seems that support for Islamism as a political ideology is on a downturn.  
But then again, what good is ideology–any ideology–given the economic constraints governments 
inevitably face and which guarantee the implementation of unpopular policies imposed in large part 
by financial institutions? The very act of forming a government on the basis of popular elections 
that have clearly yielded an unequivocal motion of distrust at the address of these supposed 
‘representatives of the people’ reveals the need for fundamental reforms of the social contract. “No 
representation hence no taxation” could be the new motto of this current. It requires a drastic 
reconfiguration of notions such as ‘representation’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘politics’ and is of course highly 
unlikely to materialize, but if asked the question, I would respond by saying that that may, in fact, 
be what the people want...  
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